According to informed sources quoted by an opposition Eritrean website, an Iranian vessel carrying a variety of weapons docked at Massawa Port on 7 December.
The report, on Adoulis.com, quoted the sources as saying that the ship, which was also carrying food items, had unloaded at a warehouse near the main dock at Massawa and alleged "that the unloading was seen by a representative of the Somali Mujahidin Youth Movement, a representatives of the Huthis [Yemeni rebel group], and a third person believed to be a representative of the opposition in Djibouti."
The item went on to note that the UN Security Council passed a resolution on 23 December to impose sanctions on Eritrea for its support of the Somali rebels and its
refusal to withdraw from territory in Djibouti.
Editor's Note: Why is it that these reports of Iranian involvement in Eritrea only come from opposition sources without any independent confirmation?
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Al-Qaida in the Maghreb Claims Responsibility for West Africa Kidnappings
The Algerian-based group al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is claiming responsibility for last month's kidnapping of three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania and a Frenchman in Mali. VOA's Scott Stearns reports the kidnapping claim came in an audio tape given to the Al Jazeera television network.
The broadcaster's website reports a man identifying himself as Saleh Abu Mohammad says that France and Spain will be informed later about the kidnappers' demands.
Spain says it can not confirm the validity of the claim, but is investigating the report.
Three Spanish aid workers were kidnapped on November 29th south of the Mauritanian city, Nouadhibou, on the road to the capital, Nouakchott. Gunmen abducted a Frenchman in eastern Mali on November 26th.
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is a Sunni organization which was formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. It began as an insurrection against Algeria's secular military rulers after they canceled parliament elections in 1992, when it appeared a coalition of Islamist groups might take power.
It has since expanded and aligned itself with the broader al-Qaida terrorist network, claiming responsibility for suicide bombings in Algeria last year and the kidnapping of two Austrian tourists in Tunisia who were later freed in Mali.
The group also claimed responsibility for last December's kidnapping of Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler and his aide in Niger, as well as the abduction of four European tourists returning from a nomadic cultural festival in January. One of those tourists was killed.
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb says it killed an American teacher in Nouakchott in June, because he was allegedly trying to convert Muslims to Christianity.
It is considered a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department and the European Union.
The broadcaster's website reports a man identifying himself as Saleh Abu Mohammad says that France and Spain will be informed later about the kidnappers' demands.
Spain says it can not confirm the validity of the claim, but is investigating the report.
Three Spanish aid workers were kidnapped on November 29th south of the Mauritanian city, Nouadhibou, on the road to the capital, Nouakchott. Gunmen abducted a Frenchman in eastern Mali on November 26th.
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is a Sunni organization which was formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. It began as an insurrection against Algeria's secular military rulers after they canceled parliament elections in 1992, when it appeared a coalition of Islamist groups might take power.
It has since expanded and aligned itself with the broader al-Qaida terrorist network, claiming responsibility for suicide bombings in Algeria last year and the kidnapping of two Austrian tourists in Tunisia who were later freed in Mali.
The group also claimed responsibility for last December's kidnapping of Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler and his aide in Niger, as well as the abduction of four European tourists returning from a nomadic cultural festival in January. One of those tourists was killed.
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb says it killed an American teacher in Nouakchott in June, because he was allegedly trying to convert Muslims to Christianity.
It is considered a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department and the European Union.
Monday, November 30, 2009
Special Operations Forces Doing Media and Marketing?
AFRICOM has issued a fact sheet on Military Information Support Teams. You can see what it says below or go to this page and look for the file on MISTs:
Military Information Support Teams (MISTs)
are funded by the United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCCOM) and support Department
of State and U.S. Embassies by augmenting or
broadening existing public diplomacy efforts.
The MIST’s partnerships with their respective U.S.
Embassy Country Teams have demonstrated their
ability to successfully provide advice and assistance
to partner nations in the development of information
activities. Synchronized with embassy goals and
objectives and with Country Team oversight, the
teams articulate USG messages by informing,
clarifying and persuading foreign audiences. MISTs
primarily work in coordination with partner nation
agencies in support of U.S. and partner nation’s
objectives, policies, interests and U.S. Africa
Command Theater Security Cooperation objectives.
Deployment of a MIST to support a U.S. Embassy is
initiated by a request from the U.S. Ambassador.
Upon arrival of the team, the Ambassador serves as
the approval authority for all disseminated products
within the partner nation. Likewise, the MIST relies on
the country team’s network to interface with the
partner nation and receive administrative, logistic and
contracting support.
MIST activities
MISTs are trained to use a variety of diverse media
platforms including local radio stations,
newspapers, and various printed materials to
focus attention on particular events or issues. Their
overall programs are synchronized with embassy
goals. These include:
--Countering violent extremist organizations’
ideology along with their recruitment and financing
efforts
--Supporting good governance and the building and
reinforcement of strong, accountable institutions
--Discouraging support for local and trans-national
crimes
--Supporting anti-smuggling/trafficking and counternarcotics
media campaigns
MIST Personnel
Teams typically consist of 3-8 personnel from the
United States Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Team size is scalable to the needs and
requirements of the mission.
Prior to their assignments, personnel receive
specialized training which includes:
--Media industry training
--Advanced marketing
--Advanced graphic illustration
--Language training
--Regional and cultural familiarity
--Department of State / interagency overview
--Anti-terrorism and personal protection training
Countries
MISTs have provided past support to U.S. Embassies
in countries such as Ethiopia, Chad and Kenya and
other nations throughout the continent.
MIST Guidelines
Under current funding authorities, MISTs can execute
their budget to support the development of
products or services in support of information
activities using various media platforms. However,
below are some examples of prohibitive items that
MIST budgets cannot be used for:
--Build infrastructure or purchase materials
--Scholarships or grants
--Animals or agriculture
--Furniture or electronics
Comment/questions: Special Operations forces doing media and marketing? In Africa? Is this just because the Defense Department has substantially more resources than State and USAID? Is this really what Congress and the American people want the military involved in? Is it effective? (And how do you measure effectiveness?)
Military Information Support Teams (MISTs)
are funded by the United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCCOM) and support Department
of State and U.S. Embassies by augmenting or
broadening existing public diplomacy efforts.
The MIST’s partnerships with their respective U.S.
Embassy Country Teams have demonstrated their
ability to successfully provide advice and assistance
to partner nations in the development of information
activities. Synchronized with embassy goals and
objectives and with Country Team oversight, the
teams articulate USG messages by informing,
clarifying and persuading foreign audiences. MISTs
primarily work in coordination with partner nation
agencies in support of U.S. and partner nation’s
objectives, policies, interests and U.S. Africa
Command Theater Security Cooperation objectives.
Deployment of a MIST to support a U.S. Embassy is
initiated by a request from the U.S. Ambassador.
Upon arrival of the team, the Ambassador serves as
the approval authority for all disseminated products
within the partner nation. Likewise, the MIST relies on
the country team’s network to interface with the
partner nation and receive administrative, logistic and
contracting support.
MIST activities
MISTs are trained to use a variety of diverse media
platforms including local radio stations,
newspapers, and various printed materials to
focus attention on particular events or issues. Their
overall programs are synchronized with embassy
goals. These include:
--Countering violent extremist organizations’
ideology along with their recruitment and financing
efforts
--Supporting good governance and the building and
reinforcement of strong, accountable institutions
--Discouraging support for local and trans-national
crimes
--Supporting anti-smuggling/trafficking and counternarcotics
media campaigns
MIST Personnel
Teams typically consist of 3-8 personnel from the
United States Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Team size is scalable to the needs and
requirements of the mission.
Prior to their assignments, personnel receive
specialized training which includes:
--Media industry training
--Advanced marketing
--Advanced graphic illustration
--Language training
--Regional and cultural familiarity
--Department of State / interagency overview
--Anti-terrorism and personal protection training
Countries
MISTs have provided past support to U.S. Embassies
in countries such as Ethiopia, Chad and Kenya and
other nations throughout the continent.
MIST Guidelines
Under current funding authorities, MISTs can execute
their budget to support the development of
products or services in support of information
activities using various media platforms. However,
below are some examples of prohibitive items that
MIST budgets cannot be used for:
--Build infrastructure or purchase materials
--Scholarships or grants
--Animals or agriculture
--Furniture or electronics
Comment/questions: Special Operations forces doing media and marketing? In Africa? Is this just because the Defense Department has substantially more resources than State and USAID? Is this really what Congress and the American people want the military involved in? Is it effective? (And how do you measure effectiveness?)
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Carson on Counterterrorism in Africa
Opening Remarks for Hearing on Counterterrorism in Africa (Sahel Region)
Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa
Washington, DC
November 17, 2009
Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and Members of the Committee:
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our counterterrorism approach in Africa’s Sahel region. I look forward to working with the Congress, and especially with this Committee, to identify appropriate tools to support the efforts of the countries in the region to improve their long-term security and constrict the ability of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a variety of criminal networks to exploit the area’s vast territory.
This hearing is very timely. While the security challenges in the Sahel are not new, several attacks in recent months against African and western targets have drawn additional focus to the situation. Key countries in the area, including Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, have intensified efforts to coordinate their activities against AQIM and address the region’s short, medium, and long-term vulnerabilities. At the same time, we have consulted with African and European partners to identify areas where we can more effectively support regional efforts to improve the security environment in the Sahel over the long-term.
The United States can play a helpful supporting role in the regional effort, but we must avoid taking actions that could unintentionally increase local tensions
or lend credibility to AQIM’s claims of legitimacy. First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate long-standing and often bloody conflicts.
AQIM’s ideology and violent tactics are antithetical to the vast majority of people in the region and the group’s ability to mobilize significant popular support for its objectives has been largely frustrated. It has failed to build and sustain meaningful alliances with insurgencies and criminal networks operating in the region. In fact, AQIM’s murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and the murder of an American citizen in Mauritania may have caused some groups in Northern Mali to sever opportunistic economic arrangements occasionally established to supplement local groups’ efforts to survive in the region’s austere environment. By contrast, the perceptions of the United States have been generally favourable throughout the Sahel, even during periods when our popularity around the world declined. It is instructive that a 2008 poll involving 18 Muslim countries revealed that Mauritanians had the highest opinion of the United States.
The countries in the region continue to demonstrate the political will to combat terrorism and trans-national crime. They have explicitly stated that the Sahel’s security is the responsibility of the countries in the region. They have not asked the United States to take on a leadership role in counterterrorism efforts and
have, in fact, clearly signalled that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the United States would be counterproductive. We fully concur that the appropriate roles for the United States and other third countries with even more significant interests in the region must be to support regional security efforts while continuing to provide meaningful development assistance to the more remote areas. Moreover, we have emphasized that while the United States will do its part, the burden must be shared.
We recognize, however, that the security environment in the Sahel requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities and capacity deficits. There is insufficient capacity to monitor and protect immense swaths of largely ungoverned or poorly governed territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers an area larger than Texas. Niger is the poorest country in the world according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali rank near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale.
The vulnerability of the northern Sahel has not only led AQIM to seek out safe-havens in the region, but has also enabled the operations of a range of trans-national criminal networks. Criminal traffickers in human beings, weapons, and narcotics also exploit parts of the region. West Africa has emerged as a major trans-shipment area for cocaine flowing from South America to Europe. Narco-trafficking poses a direct threat to U.S. interests since the proceeds of cocaine
trafficked through the region generally flow back to Latin American organizations moving drugs to the United States.
The Committee has asked how our counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel relate to our long-term goals of good governance, civilian control over security forces, and respect for human rights. The first priority President Obama has identified for our Africa policy is helping to build strong and stable democracies on the continent. This is essential in West Africa. In recent years, the region has witnessed two military coups in Mauritania, deeply flawed elections in Nigeria, and an undemocratic seizure of power in Niger. Our experience in the region has underscored the urgency of improving governance, strongly promoting the rule of law, developing durable political and economic institutions at all levels of society, and maintaining professional security forces under civilian control.
Meaningful progress in these areas is crucial to the success of ongoing efforts against AQIM and other criminal networks. The groups are drawn to areas where they can take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their operating spaces and lifelines, cross borders with impunity, and attract recruits. They benefit when security forces and border guards lack the necessary training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their activities. Their cause is advanced when human rights abuses undermine the credibility of security forces. Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak
or corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute and incarcerate all forms of criminals.
Underdevelopment in key areas represents a critical security challenge in the Sahel. The region is extremely diverse and the sources of insecurity in the region vary. In Northern Mali, for example, insecurity in isolated border areas and along traditional smuggling routes is perpetuated by unmet economic expectations and the lack of legitimate alternatives to smuggling or opportunistic commerce with criminal networks. Mali is one of Africa’s most stable democracies, but its efforts to address insecurity in the northern part of the country are severely hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability to provide adequate service delivery and educational and vocational opportunities to isolated areas. This dynamic can become particularly problematic in cases where AQIM has provided small amounts of food and other consumables to generate good-will or at least tolerance from groups living in their vicinity.
Although AQIM’s attempts to recruit in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel have been largely unsuccessful, its limited successes in countries such as Mauritania can largely be traced to its ability to capitalize on the frustration among the young over insufficient educational or vocational opportunities. AQIM has also attracted recruits and material support from isolated communities or
neighbourhoods in Mauritania and elsewhere that lack alternatives to schools, media or networking centers that promote violent extremism.
The United States’ primary instrument to advance counterterrorism objectives in the Sahel and the Maghreb is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP is a multi-year commitment designed to support partner country efforts in the Sahel and the Maghreb to constrict and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist organization to exploit the region. The rationale and overarching strategy for TSCTP was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee in 2005. TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia; Burkina Faso was added in 2009.
TSCTP serves two primary purposes. The program identifies and mobilizes resources from throughout the interagency to support sustained efforts to address violent extremism in the region. It was understood when TSCTP was created that sporadic engagements without adequate follow-up or sustainment would fail to achieve meaningful long-term results in a region with a multitude of basic needs. The emphasis was therefore placed on key capacity deficits that could be addressed over a period of years. The program draws resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S. government including the State Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID. As the threat levels, political environments and material
needs differ substantially among the partner countries, most engagements and assistance packages under TSCTP are tailored to fit the priorities of the individual countries.
TSCTP was also designed to coordinate the activities of the various implementing agencies. The coordination takes place at several levels. Action Officers representing the various agencies meet periodically in Washington to coordinate activities and share information. Representatives from Washington and AFRICOM also meet regularly with our Embassies in TSCTP countries. The first line of coordination and oversight takes place at our Embassies. While various assessments and inputs from throughout the interagency inform decisions regarding TSCTP programming, Chiefs of Mission must concur with all proposed activities. They are best placed to understand the immediate and long-term implications of various activities and are ultimately the primary interlocutors with the host countries.
Forming a definitive conclusion at this relatively early stage regarding whether our counter-terrorism approach in the Sahel is working is difficult, but we believe that we are making important progress. For example, TSCTP resources contributed to training and equipping more capable and professional security forces in Mauritania. We believe that our work with Mali to support more professional units capable of improving the security environment in the country
will have future benefits if they are sustained. Our public affairs teams and USAID are implementing a range of beneficial exchanges and projects in Mali and promoting outreach to communities potentially vulnerable to extremism in Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, and elsewhere.
The decision in 2005 to focus on long-term capacity-building rather than search for quick fixes was clearly correct, even more so given the limited absorptive capacity of these countries. Clear victories against the underlying security and developmental challenges in the region are unlikely to clearly announce themselves in the near term, but I am confident that a steady and patient approach provides the best opportunity for success.
The recognition that we must take a holistic approach involving multiple agencies was also correct. Efforts to improve interagency coordination and the vital coordination between our Missions and program managers in Washington and Stuttgart have been crucial. We continue to seek a balance between the financial resources for the development and diplomatic pieces of TSCTP and funding devoted to military to military activities. We will continue to work toward a balanced approach envisioned when the program was created.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you have.
Thursday, November 12, 2009
Ship Hijackers To Airplane Skyjackers?
VOA's Alisha Ryu in Nairobi has an intriguing news item this week about Somali ship hijackers becoming air pirates.Here it is in full:
An eyewitness account of an attempted plane hijacking last week in Somalia's northern semi-autonomous Puntland region suggests would-be hijackers were members of a pirate gang, whose operations have been affected by the increased international naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden.
Last Tuesday, about 30 passengers boarded a commercial plane in the northeastern town of Bosasso for a short flight to neighboring Djibouti.
Among the passengers was Yusuf M. Hassan, a Somali-American journalist and the former managing editor of Garowe Online Web site. Hassan tells VOA he noticed two German journalists on board, but he says no one noticed two young Somali men, sitting quietly in the first row.
"The plane was not in the air for more the three minutes when some guy in the very front jumped up and, in the Somali language, said, 'This plane has been hijacked.' When the pilot heard his very loud voice and a woman in the front scream, the pilot closed and locked his door," he said.
The move angered the would-be hijacker, who waved a handgun and fired at the cockpit door several times. Hassan says the bullets glanced off the door and ricocheted above the heads of screaming passengers.
"His demands were - one, he wants the plane landed in Las Qorey, and two, he wants to keep the plane and the two German journalists," he added. "I guess the rest of us were supposed to walk from Las Qorey to wherever we had to walk to."
Las Qorey is a coastal town in the disputed Sanaag region, which straddles Puntland and the breakaway republic of Somaliland, and is home to a gang of pirates.
The gang made international headlines last June by capturing two German tourists sailing off the coast of Yemen. The tourists were freed two months later in exchange for a $1 million ransom.
Hassan says the Russian captain of the Daallo flight turned the plane, making it appear it was flying toward Las Qorey. But the pilot was taking the plane back to Bosasso. Hassan says the lead gunmen, unaware his demand was being ignored, made a call on his cell phone as the plane descended toward Bosasso airport.
"I remember him saying to whomever he was talking to, he said, 'Guys, do you see us? The plane is landing.' I am thinking he is speaking to his gang in Las Qorey, who are waiting," he said.
The plane landed safely in Bosasso. Surrounded by security forces, the gunmen tried to escape from the plane hiding behind passengers, but they were caught.
Hassan says through various contacts, he subsequently learned that at least one of the gunmen was a member of the pirate group in Las Qorey, which has had trouble seizing vessels for ransom in the well-patrolled waters off Somalia's northern coast.
"My understanding is that because of NATO operations, the pirate gangs have lost a lot of money. And any time the pirates do not seize enough boats, they begin kidnapping western people," he explained.
More than 30 warships from 16 nations are patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the surrounding area and their presence has had an effect on the number of ships pirates have been able to seize. According to the International Maritime Bureau, the number of successful hijacks has dropped from an average of one in 6.4 vessels in 2008 to one in nine vessels this year.
But the International Maritime Bureau reports the number of attempted hijackings surged dramatically in 2009. Somali pirates are also shifting their operations farther out to sea. On Monday, a Hong Kong-registered oil tanker was attacked by pirates in the Indian Ocean, more than 1,800 kilometers off the Somali coast.
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Can Anyone Say "Al-Qaida Threat"?
The United States is giving new vehicles, communications and other equipment, and military clothing to Mali.According to a U.S. embassy statement in Bamako, in a ceremony at the Ministry of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Mali Gillian Milovanovic transferred 37 brand-new Land Cruiser pickup trucks, along with powerful communications equipment that will allow Malian security forces to move, transport and communicate across wide expanses of open desert.
In addition, replacement parts, clothing, individual equipment and other supplies will be provided in the next few weeks for a U.S. Government initiative totaling more than 5 million U.S. dollars (2.3 Billion CFA).
"These capacity-building assets are evidence of U.S. long-term support for the Malian government and its people," Milovanovic said. "We remain dedicated to responding to the needs of our Malian friends, allies, and partners to secure their borders and to achieve peace and security."
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Is Natural Fire 10 A Cover for Armed Operations Vs the LRA?
No. Not according to a spokesman for AFRICOM. Vince Crawley dismisses the suggestion made in a recent East African article, telling AFRICOMWatch:
"The exercise in Northern Uganda is not related to any action against the LRA. It is focused on building partnership and closer military cooperation between the nations of the East Africa Community."
Q: Why Kitgum?
A: "The government of Uganda requested the exercise be based in Kitgum. It is an area that in the past has been affected by regional conflict and instability, and it's our understanding that the government of Uganda seeks to use the exercise as part of ongoing work to foster closer ties with this community. Planning for this exercise has been under way for well over a year."
And Crawley adds, "If you refer to a map, you'll see that Kitgum is not especially close to the interborder area where the LRA has been operating in recent years."
But aren't the U.S. troops participating in the exercise carrying weapons? Is that standard for what is a primarily humanitarian exercise?
A: "When military personnel take part in exercises, it is routine for to deploy with weapons for training purposes, though they may not carry their weapons at all times."
The East African publication speculated that "the decision to site the exercise in northern Uganda raises questions about whether it may presage a renewed US-supported assault
against the Lord's Resistance Army."
The publication recalled the "US provided operational support to a joint Ugandan-DR Congo-Southern Sudan offensive last December that was aimed at capturing or killing LRA leader Joseph Kony and dealing a decisive blow to an insurgency that has terrorised Ugandan civilians for the past 20 years. But the operation dubbed Lightning Thunder failed in its objectives."
Guess we will just have to wait and see.
"The exercise in Northern Uganda is not related to any action against the LRA. It is focused on building partnership and closer military cooperation between the nations of the East Africa Community."
Q: Why Kitgum?
A: "The government of Uganda requested the exercise be based in Kitgum. It is an area that in the past has been affected by regional conflict and instability, and it's our understanding that the government of Uganda seeks to use the exercise as part of ongoing work to foster closer ties with this community. Planning for this exercise has been under way for well over a year."
And Crawley adds, "If you refer to a map, you'll see that Kitgum is not especially close to the interborder area where the LRA has been operating in recent years."
But aren't the U.S. troops participating in the exercise carrying weapons? Is that standard for what is a primarily humanitarian exercise?
A: "When military personnel take part in exercises, it is routine for to deploy with weapons for training purposes, though they may not carry their weapons at all times."
The East African publication speculated that "the decision to site the exercise in northern Uganda raises questions about whether it may presage a renewed US-supported assault
against the Lord's Resistance Army."
The publication recalled the "US provided operational support to a joint Ugandan-DR Congo-Southern Sudan offensive last December that was aimed at capturing or killing LRA leader Joseph Kony and dealing a decisive blow to an insurgency that has terrorised Ugandan civilians for the past 20 years. But the operation dubbed Lightning Thunder failed in its objectives."
Guess we will just have to wait and see.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
